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ABSTRACT
The paper analyzes the change inunemployment in 12 OECD countries over
the period 1970—83 in terms ofunderlying aggregate supply and demand shifts.
Earlier evidence on wage gaps (given by Brunoand Sachs) is revised and
extended. For most European countries aprocess of reduction in gaps is
taking place in the 1980's, but theaverage absolute levels, when weighted by
country size, are still sizeable, thus a 'classical' elementof unemployment
remains. However, most of the large additionalincrease in unemployment after
1980 (as well as the profitsqueeze and investment slowdown) is ascribed to
the contractionary stance of macropolicy in Europe, in contrast to the
subsequent expansion and sharp fall of unemployment inthe U.S. The large
U.S. deficit coupled with monetary restraint andthe resulting dollar
appreciation also account for the sharp difference in thebehavior of import
prices in the U.S. and Europe which in turnmay explain the considerably
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Introduction
Unemploymentin the OECD countries hascontinued to rise to unprecedented
levels. The EEC countries, which
on average ended the turbulent l97O's
with an unemployment rate of closeto 7 percent are now, in the mid80's,
approaching an 11 percent level. The U.S. is
virtually the only country
for which the changes in
unemployment during the l970's have not been
systematically upward and for which the 1984rate was, more or less, back
to where it had been both ten
years and five years earlier (see Figure1).
The reasons for the sustained
increase in unemployment during the
l97O's as well as the possible
reasons for differences in patternsacross
industrial countries have beenstudied but question marksundoubtedly
remain. Our own emphasis in an earlierstudy has been on the combination
of the great supply shocks of theprevious decade and thecontractionary
macro—policy response of most OECD countriesto these shocks as well ason
the more recent policy
co—ordination problem between the U.S.and Europe.
With a few more
years that have elapsed and quite a fewpercentage points
of additional unemployment thereis obviously room for bothan update and
a reappraisal.1
See Bruno and Sachs(1985). The period coveredin that study extended only up to 1981 for which the
coverage in terms of data for individual countries was still incomplete.It is worth Pointingout that between 1981 and 1985 the number
of unemployed in Europeincreased by almost 50 percent!—2—
Starting from a fairly conventional aggregatesupply (AS) and aggre-
gate demand (AD) macro—frameworkan increase in unemployment may come
about as a result of a leftward shiftof either the AS curve or the AD
curve or a combination thereof (see Figure2). The first 'pure' case of
a supply shock brings aboutboth unemployment and inflation and is
generally understood to havecharacterized the period both immediately
before and after the first oil shock (1973—74),the extent of resulting
stagflation in various countries depending onthe extent of real wage
rigidity. Such shift from southwest tonortheast in the unemployment—
inflation framework (see Figure 1) has alsocharacterized the second
oil shock (1979—80). An added leftward biasof the AS curve in the
1970's may have been caused by the depressive effectof the profit
squeeze on capital accumulation.All of these have imparted a
'classical' element to the unemployment which has certainly notbeen
present in earlier, cyclical unemploymentepisodes. However, even the
developments immediately following the twooil shocks cannot be
understood without explicit regard being paid to contractionarYforces
coming from leftward shifts in theAD schedule-s of countries (see
Figure 2).
The period immediately following the first oil shock(1974—77) cer-
tainly looks more like a conventional northwest tosoutheast movement down
a short—run Phillips curve (see Figure 1).In terms of the story for the
1970's this could be explained as a combination of the depressingeffect
of oil and raw material prices on real income, theanti—inflationary
response of macro policy to thefirst oil shock and the interaction of
depressed world markets on export demand inthe individual countries. A
similar story, with some variations, could still betold for 1980—81. From—3—
that phase onwards the differentialmovement of unemployment in the U.S.
and Europe has become a central issue whichrequires analysis in its own
right.
In the coming sections we takeup the main issues pertaining to the
role of AS and AD factors in therising unemployment. Section I recon-
siders the concept of the realwage gap, and applies alternative measures
to the data up to and including 1983. Ourgeneral finding is that by the
end of the period consideredwage gaps for most countries recorded have
come down from their peak levels in 1979—81, butare still sizable on
average in Europe. Section II takes up the role of the profitsqueeze. We
find that while profits have playeda very important role in the invest-
ment slowdown the main reason for the profitsqueeze has come from depres-
sed demand conditions and less from the directeffect of high real wages.
While the slowdown in capital growthmay provide an eventual constraint on
rapid growth in the manufacturing sector it isunlikely to be an obstacle
to expansion at the present moment due toexcess capacity.
Section III takes a summary overview of thedemand for labour in the
manufacturing sector applying a neoclassical demandcurve for labour with
some Keynesian AD elements superimposed on it. Section IVreconsiders the
overall unemployment performance of countriesin terms of the basic under-
lying AS and AD components reinforcing theargument that the more recent
rise in unemployment is primarily an ADcontraction phenomenon. The last
section (V) discusses the dilemma of individualcountry expansion and
reconfirms the argument that there is a seriouspolicy co—ordination prob-
lem between the U.S. and Europe in which thelarge U.S. deficit coupled
with monetary restraint and the European fearof renewed inflation have
simultaneously provided the conditions for rapid U.S.expansion and the—4—
sluggishness of revival in Europe.The policy proposals recently put
forward,2 calling for co—ordinated, more active expansion in Europe with
some incomes policy hedges, thus receiveadded support.
I. The Rise and Gradual Fall of Wa&e Gaps
Several studies have produced evidence that for a numberof countries
during the 1970s, at least, an important supplyfactor has been a persis-
tent excess of real wage levels above the marginal productof labour at
full employment.3 It is therefore important to updateand reconsider the
evidence from the vantage point of the mid—1980s.
Assuming a well—behaved production function in termsof value added:
V =F(L,K; t), and suppose one can measure the marginal productat full
employment (Li), FL(L, K; t). Under output—market clearingand competi-
tive firms (W/P) =FL(L,
K; t) is the level of product wage at which
labour demand will equalL. The wage gap, wX, is the percentage
deviation of the actual product wage W/Pover (W/P) or, in log—
linear approximation, wX =(w— — (w—
Thenotion that the marginal product of labour may mean somethingin
the aggregate or that the aggregate demand for labour may depend onthe
real wage is, of course, controversial, mainly because ofthe competitive
assumption implied for firms. We here proceed underthe supposition that
2See, for example, Layard etal. (1984).
See Sachs (1981), Bruno and Sachs (1985), Artus (1984), Lipschitzand
Schadler (1984), McCallum(1984),and OECD Economic Outlook, miscel-
laneous issues.—5---
like many artifacts in applied macro—economics, thenotion of a wage gap
could, under certain circumstances and with somecaveats, perform a useful
diagnostic function. When based on a sub—sector likemanufacturing it may,
perhaps, be less controversial than otherwise, since formost economies
this is a highly tradable industry and one that isreasonably
competitive.
Under a CES production function withelasticity of substitution a
betweenL and K the elasticity of demand for labour withrespect to
the product wage is C/Ski whereSk is the capital share in value
added. Thus, a log—linear approximation of theemployment shortfall in the
short run (i.e., at given capital stock, k5) dueto a positive wage gap
is given by
(1) d —= _(a/sk)wX (d = whenwX =0)
The main problem of measurement lies inestimating the marginal pro-
duct of labour at full employment. Inprinciple, one could estimate the
production technology directly and calculateFL forL. Such estimates
must usually assume market clearing on ayear—to—year basis, which is
obviously problematic. The alternative procedure followed hereis to
suggest a range of estimates of wX under alternativeassumptions from
which, it is argued, a general picture nonethelessemerges.
Note that as long as marginal revenues of firmsmove with prices (i.e.,
there is a constant 'degree of monopoly'), thenotion of a wage gap
could still remain valid even under monopolisticcompetition.
The importance of this caveat will be furtherclarified below.—6—
The simplest assumption for calculating wX is the Cobb—Douglas
technology (o= 1)for which the marginal product moves parallel to the
average product and the problem then boils down to measuringthe gap
between (w — andthe trend of the average product at full employment
— 9),namely, a corrected relative wage share measure, normalized by
some base—year benchmark. Table 1 gives this first measure for 12OECD
countries taking the benchmark for wX {=w—v
—(v— tobe 0 on
average during the period 1965—69 and taking the average growth ratesof
v —Zduring 1960—73 and 1973—85 to represent the respective "full
employment" trend (v —£).
Thefindings based on the simplest measure of the gap suggest that
after a rise in the gap in the early 1970s and a very sharp rise during
the first oil shock, to a weighted average of 11 percent by the end of the
decade, there was a gradual fall in most countries from about 1980 onward.
The move in a downward direction seems to have become more marked during
1982—83. The table also underscores the fact that there are sharp differ-
ences among countries both for the peak years and for the deceleration.
The U.S. and Canada importantly show very little variation during the oil
shock, and only the Netherlands and Sweden were the exception to an other-
wise real wage—resistant Europe.7 The U.K. and Belgium stand out as two
6While 1960 and 1973 probably represented cyclical peaks, 1983, which is
the last observation in our data, is obviously not. The alternative
followed in Bruno and Sachs (1985) took 1979 to be a cyclical peak and
extrapolated through that year. Both procedures are problematic, and an
alternative trend measure of yf —2after 1973 is given below
(Table 2).
See Bruno and Sachs (1985) for an extensive discussion of the differ-
ence between nominal and real wage rigidity. French data on the low
wage gap shown here may be misleading (see discussioncit.and also
Table 2).—7—
countries with large remaining gaps by the end of theperiod. Japan's 1979
figure, one can argue, is misleading since the referenceperiod, 1965—69,
probably did not reflect an equilibrium in its labour market.8Anyway, it
shows substantial reduction after 1979.
We consider two major sensitivity tests for thebasic measure used in
Table 1, one having to do with thetechnology and the other with the
hypothetical measure of — duringthe recent unemployment years.
The first argument against findings basedon the simple measure of
wX comes from the assumedunitary elasticity of substitution. We know
that when a < 1 a rise in realwages will also show in a rising labour
share in value—added, which would havenothing to do with disequilibrium.
The sharpness of the rise in wX in themid—19705 and its subsequent fall
towards the early l980s would cast doubton such explanation, but it is
nonetheless important to see how sensitive thisresult is to the size of
a. Various recent studies of the production functionfor manufacturing
across countries suggest the assumption of Harrod—neutraltechnical
progress and a range of estimates of a between 0.5 and 1, withan
average of about
We recalculated —9!on the two alternative assumptions a =0.5
and a =0.7using the approximation formula1°
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and again applying it to the trend between the 'peak' years1960, 1973,
1983.
The above approximation obviously requires knowledge of capitalstock
figures, which were available for only 8 ofthe countries in question. The
last three lines of Table 1 give a summary average estimatefor these 8
countries (Belgium, Denmark, Italy, and the Netherlands areexcluded here)
for the 3 assumptions on 0, from which we can see that the1979 and 1981
peak estimates of wX are only slightly modified.There is a somewhat
larger difference in the subsequent years —thesmaller a,thelarger is
the estimated reduction in the gap by 1982. There are, of course,differ-
ences for individual countries (these data are not reproducedhere), but
the general result holds on average.
The second sensitivity test involves an alternative estimate for
v — whichattempts to correct for the effect of the unemployment
level and changes thereof on full employment productivity growth.The
method used" was to run for each country a regression of labour producti-
vity on unemployment, the current and lagged change in unemploymentand
time, with a time shift factor after 1975:
(note 10 continued:)





Under Hicks—neutrality we would similarly get
v, =(v—) +[(1 —a)/a]sk(k
—2).Here the correction would be
larger, since k —ichanged by more than (k —v).
See Bruno and Sachs (1985), chap. 9.—9—
(3) v -= a0÷a1t + a2t7583 ÷a3U ÷a4U+a5AU1
Generally, as one would expect,cz3 > 0 and a4, a5 < 0 (the
regressions are not reproduced here).
By setting U = = = 0in the estimated equationone gets
an estimate of — whichwas used instead of the simpletrend, again
normalized to zero in '65—'69.
The resulting adjustedestimates are given in Table 2. Itis inter—
esting to note that on the whole the
previous general finding remains
intact, both concerning the size ofthe increase in 1976 and thegradual
fall after 1979. The two
extreme cases, Belgium and the UnitedKingdom,
now look even worse, and itseems that France too is in muchworse shape
once the correction for
unemployment is made. We note that theweighted
mean for Europe, when Belgium andthe U.K. are excluded, showsa lower
peak but only a very mild slowdown.
An important question thatarises relates to thesources of these
changes in the measuredwage gap. At least a partial answer is
provided by
a breakdown of changes in thewage gap (*X) into the parts attributableto
the real consumption
wage (IC), the changes in relativeconsumption to
product prices (— ), wherethe latter include changesin relative
import prices, and assumedProductivity trend (v —
Table3 provides a breakdown of X
by sub—period (using the basic
measure of Table 1) using theidentity
(4) +c
— —
Thetable suggests that realwage moderation has attenuated the effectof— 10—
realimport prices (as reflectedin — onwX in the second oil
shock (see 1978—80, unlike 1970—74).
The deceleration of relative import
prices in 1980—83 is themain explanatory factor behind theconcomitant
fall in wX. We shall come back tothe role of this negative supply shock
in Section V.
II. The Role of the Profit Sgueez
The general picture that emerges from thedata shown in the last section
suggests that during the depression yearsof the early 1980s the wage gap
has most probably been reduced in all but two orthree countries. What
this implies is that at given capitalstock levels (providing the esti-
mated wage gap is also applicable to thewhole economy, and not only to
the manufacturing sector), the demandfor labour would come closer to
maintenance of full employment. The emphasis onthe word given is impor-
tant because both the labour forceand the capital stock normally grow at
some balanced rate from which wehave abstracted so far. The point is that
when the capital stock levels depart from their previousgrowth paths this
could be an additional argument for a gap betweenlabour demand and full
employment, quite apart from Keynesian arguments
to which we turn later. A
fall in investment demand could be linked to a profit squeezewhich, in
itself, may have been caused by an increasein the price of other factors
of production (material inputs and labour), bydepressed demand condi-
tions, or (as in fact was the case) by acombination of both.
In the absence of full—fledged investment
demand functions based on a
q—measure of rationally expectedprofits, we here apply a rather simple—— 11—
mindedapproach in which capital stock
growth is expressed as a function
of past profits (a three—yearaverage is used in the data below) and the
real rate of interest. The real
rate of profit, in turn, isexpressed as a
function of the real productwage (based on the factor—price_frontier)and
a measure of demand pressure.
Let r denote the logarithmof the real rate ofprofit (where pro-
fits are deflated by GDPprices and the capital stockby investment goods
prices) and w the logarithm of
the product wage. A log—linearapproxi-
mation of the factor price frontier
(FPF) can be written In the form
(5)
where
a1 should equal minus the ratio of the labour and
capital shares,
and A is the labour
augmenting technical progressparameter (for the
case of Harrod—neutral technical
progress which is assumed here).
For deviations from the FPFdue to short—term demandfluctuations we
add a term
a2d to equation (5) and also allow fora drop in productivity
growth after 1974 by adding
a slope dummy (D7582) to theequation for
estimation. The regressionequation and the estimates foreight countries
are given in Table 4. For the d
variable a proxy was used in theform of
the ratio ofmanufacturing output over itsten—year moving average. 12
12
This procedure was followedin a recent OECD memo. We alsoexperimented with monetary, fiscal, andworld—trade variables torepresent aggregate demand (see below). Forsome countries, the unemploymentrate as well as its first difference,
using two—stage least squares forw, serves the same purpose. Broadlysimilar results are obtained, butd seems a better aggregate
proxy for all countries. For the basis ofadding a demand variable to the FPFsee Bruno (1984). There the ratioof hours worked to the employment level
was used as a proxy for d, whichalso works reasonably well.— 12—
Forall countries the a1 coefficient comesout negative, as expec-
ted, though in the case ofFrance and Italy it is statisticallyinsignifi-
cant. As to its relative size,the average for the eight countries,1.62,
seems reasonable as it implies alabour share of 0.62. The averageelasti-
city for the d coefficient (a2)is 3.02. The implied technical progress
coefficients can be got from the ratio —a3/a1(corrected by the slope
a4 after74) for the various countries. Running across—section regres-
sion for the first differences ofall countries (with country intercept
dummies) gives a lower coefficientfor the wage elasticity (—0.82 with
s.e. 0.27) and about the samefor the output coefficient (2.69with s.e.
0.19), the 2 for the overall regression(136 observations) is 0.62.
Next consider the relationship betweeninvestment and profits. A
glance at the average data bysub—period suggests that the slowdownin
capital accumulation both acrosscountries and over time is correlated
with the extent of the profit squeeze.A cross—section regression of
period averages for the rate of changeof the capital stock with the
average rate of profitand the real rate of interest givesthe following
two alternative regressions for alinear or logarithmic specification (the








Bothequations show a very strong effect of the profitrate and an
insignificant effect of the real rate of interest. The
economic reasoning
behind the former could be via the effectof present profit rates on the
expectations of future profits or elsemay be a the result of financing
constraint on firms which enhances investment from
retained earnings when
the latter increase. Whichever the channelit is obviously a strong rela-
tionship. It is further borne out by individual
country regressions given
in Table 5. These are basedon annual data and a logarithmic specification
(with the exception of the U.K. in whichonly the linear form gave signi-
ficant results). There the profitvariable ()standsfor the log average
profit rate for the last threeyears.
Table 5 shows the elasticity of
capital stock growth with respect to
profits to be highly significant in almostall cases (the U.S. is apos-
sible exception), theaverage value being 1.46. The coefficient for the
real interest rate issignificantly negative in only three cases'3(only
one case with a significantly positive
coefficient, France, makes no
economic sense).
Writing the investment equation in the form
(7)
and substituting for from r in equation (5) wecan express the
growth in the capital stock as a function of thereal product wage
(level), the demand variable (d) and thereal interest rate (leaving out
time shifts):
13
The limited role of interestrates may be due to the fact thatthey are much more volatile than profits [see Iiedaand Yoshikawa (1985)].- 14—




Looking at the size of the implied elasticitiesand the actual change
in the underlying variables one major conclusion emerges —thereal wage
could not but have a relatively small direct role in the slowdownof
capital accumulation while the output contraction (fromthe demand side)
played the dominant role in the profit squeeze andthe resulting contrac—
tion in investment.
The product of the average a1 (1.6) and the average b1 (1.5) gives an
elasticity of 2.4. A permanent increase in w of 5 percent overits
equilibrium level would thus imply a fall in k of 12percent.14 We know
from Section I that in the mid 70's there were temporary increases of w,
which on average were twice that but by the beginning of the1980's the
gap for most countries had already comedown substantially. At the same
time the rate of growth of the capital stock was cut to less thanhalf its
rate over the decade for most european countries for which data are recor-
ded here. The total elasticity for the d variable, on the other hand
(b1a2), amounts to 4.5 and the relativefall in its level over the period
was of the order of 20 percent ,thus being capable of 'explaining'drops
of up to 90 percent in k.
This general assessment of the relative importance of the two factors
(as well as a minute role for the real rate of interest) also emergeswhen
an analysis of components is carried out by individual country(not repro-
duced here). We may thus conclude that while the profit squeeze probably
14The average product of a1b1 (rather than the product of the averages)
is 2.22. The highest product of a1b1 by half the wage gap in 1976 (see
Table 1), from among the eight countries recorded, is 0.24 for Germany
with all other countries far below that.— 15—
playedan important role in the investment slowdown, for most countries
and for most of the time, high realwages played only a small direct role
in the latter. Indirectly, of course, thecontractionary bias of macro-
economic policy was probably related towage rigidity (fear of inflation),
but this is another matter to which we shallreturn. First we take a
summary overview of the factors affecting employment in manufacturing.
III.An Analysis of the Demand for Labour in Manufacturjzg
To takea summary view of the factors affecting employment in manufac—
turing we modify the conventional demand curve for labour byassuming
gradual adjustment[2, —2,=(2,d—)J aswell as a short—run role
for aggregate demand factors. For the latter threevariables were used —
thegovernment deficit (df, corrected for full employment and inflation),
deviations from the trend in world trade (d) and the realmoney stock
(m, lagged). For most countries there is considerablepositive correlation
between the fiscal and monetary variables andonly for the U.S., where the
two conflicted, did the monetary variable play animportant separate role
(M2 was used and the world trade variable was not included). The log







We note that with the exception of the U.S. and Canadaall other— 16—
countriesshow significant negative coefficients for the product wage
variable. The 'long—run' elasticity (but at given capital stock) of labour
demand varies from about one half for Belgium and Norway to two and above
for Japan, Denmark, France and the Netherlands (these values are obtained
by dividing c2 by 1—c1). The implied elasticity of substitution canbe
obtained by multiplication of these values by the share of capital which
for most countries is of the order of 1/3 (somewhat higher for Japan). The
world trade variable is significantly positive in most cases as is the
deficit variable for those countries for which data could be included.
The direct role attributed to aggregate demand in these regressions
is certainly not negligible and if we add the indirect role working
through the investment slowdown it is quite sizable. In the way we have
specified the model it is constrained to show constant returns to scale in
labour and capital and thus any factor accounting for a 1 percent cut in
the rate of change of k also, ceteris paribus, indirectly accounts for the
same in terms of the rate of change in manhours. At the same time,the fact
that the demand slowdown played a direct role in the regression provides
evidence that by the end of that period (after considerable demand slow-
down) there was probably no capacity constraint. This is also borne out by
direct measurements of capacity utilisation [see European Community
business surveys quoted in European Economy, 1983, and in Layard et al.
(1984)].
IV. An Analysis of Overall Unemployment
So far the analysis dealt only with the manufacturing sector. There are
obvious advantages to a consideration of that sector both for analytical— 17—
reasons(a neoclassical labour demand framework ismore defensible for
this sector, at least in a typical Europeanopen economy context) and
because such data as productwages and capital input are more readily
available. We do not, at the moment, have asatisfactory aggregate macro-
economic model formally combining demand andsupply factors in a way that
could be used for econometric estimation of labourdemand, especially in
an imperfectly competitive setting. In the absencethereof, we make do
with an ad—hoc formulation, which follows thelogic of the preceding
discussionand could also be given justificationonthe basisof gradual
adjustmentto aggregate demand and aggregate supply withina disequilib-
rium setting.'5
We write down a reduced form in whichunemployment is expressed as a
function of the lagged realwage gap, and the aggregate demand factors
with two lags for each. The more distantlags could be rationalized on the
basis of delayed effects working eitheron the aggregate demand schedule
or via profitability and capital investmenton the aggregate supply side.
It is in that 'hybrid' sense that the results ofTable 7 should be inter-
preted.
Table 7 presents unemploymentregressions for eight countries. Only in
the case of the U.S. both themonetary and fiscal variables appear (with-
out the world trade variable). In the case of the othercountries the
addition of a fiscal variable did not makeany significant difference and
the lagged real money stock variables seemedto do all of the action on
the domestic demand side.'6 We note that thesigns of coefficients are, in
See Bruno and Sachs (1985), chap. 10.
We have no explanation as to why the fiscalvariable seems to perform
better in the manufacturing labour demandequation and the monetary
variable works better here.— 18—
mostcases, the 'right'ones,17 although they are not always significant
at the 1 percent level.
Because of the statistical problems that areattached to this type of
single equation estimation for each country,there is some advantage to
also taking an overall cross—section view of therise in unemployment
using the same underlying model.The following is the resulting regression


















With the exception of the second lag on money (whichcould be left
out), all coefficients have the right sign and are highlysignificant
(numbers in brackets are standard errors ofcoefficients). The assumption
underlying (10), that the elasticities are the same acrosscountries, is,
of course, problematic, but it is reassuring tofind such a strong overall
qualitative result. If one adds dummy variablesfor countries and/or each
time period, none of these dummies come out significant,and the overall
regression is not improved.
The average quantitative implications that could be readinto the
regression is that for each 1 percent rise (fall)in the wage gap, the
unemployment rate rises (falls) by 0.15 percentwithin two years, while
17Only one of the 16 coefficients of the wage gap is significantly nega-
tive, for the case of the regression for Francewhich is suspect anyway
(see discussion below). Most of the coefficients onthe demand varia-
bles are negative as expected.— 19—
foreach 1 percent drop in the rate of growth in realmoney stock,
unemployment rises by 0.06 percent after a year.
Consider, for example, the average drop in realmoney growth between
1974—78 and 1978—82, which was about 4percent in annual average terms.
The regression would thus attribute an annualaverage rise of 0.24 percent
in the unemployment rate to this factor alone in the last period.'8
Table 8 gives a summary analysis of theanalogous regressions that
were based on the adjusted wage gap measure (theseregressions are not
reported here). It indicates the role of the major factorsaccounting for
the increase in unemployment in eachcountry. For each period the average
cumulative change in the average unemployment rate since 1965—69is given,
as well as the estimated role of the adjustedwage gap (with its two lags)
and the sum total of the aggregate demand factors. Thetable reinforces
the earlier finding that wages played animportant role mainly in the mid—
seventies and primarily for three of the countries recorded (theU.K.,
Belgium and Denmark) and that its relative importance formost countries
diminished during the last sub—period, 1978—82, wheremost of the
incremental increase in unemployment can be attributedto aggregate demand
shifts (subtract the second column of Table 8 from the thirdor fourth
column). However, by 1982 the average remaining effect of thewage factor
sèkremainedhigh for the 5 European countries recorded in this table.
18
The 'world trade' factor hereappears separately, although it, too,
could ultimately, in a world model, be attributed to 'domestic'con-
traction in all countries combined. Its impliedresponse coefficient of
0.16 'explains' a rise in unemployment of 0.4percent annually during
1974—78 and 0.3 percent during 1978—82.— 20—
V.Inflation, Exchange Rates and the Co—ordination Problem
The previous discussion has highlighted the dominant role of contraction—
ary macro—policy in the recent furtherrise of unemployment in Europe.
The same framework is also consistent with the concomitant fall in unem-
ployment in the U.S., given the extensive fiscal expansionin that country
since 1981. We conclude the discussion by noting that it is the combina-
tion of fiscal expansion and monetary contraction in the U.S. which, at
least in part, may indirectly account for the reluctance to expand in
Europe on account of sluggish inflation deceleration. The causallink is
provided by exchange rate developments during the same period.
The rise in real interest rates and net capital flows into the U.S.
account for the large dollar appreciation since the beginning of 1981 (of
the order of 50 percent nominal and 38 percent in real terms). This has
had a dramatic effect on the relative import price developments in the
U.S. as compared to Europe which, we would argue, is the dominant reason
for the differential inflation performance on the two sides of the Atlan-
tic (see Figure 1).19 The evidence for this is so striking that it is hard
to understand why it often gets overlooked.
Consider the following two sets of numbers for annual rates of change
in import prices and consumer prices for the U.S. and the average for the
EEC countries since 1980:
19The drop in world relative commodity prices is the dominant factor in
the overall inflation slowdown while exchange rates have respectively
enhanced or weakened their effect. For cross—section analyses of Infla-
tion in the OECD countries emphasizing the key role of import prices
and exchange rates see Bruno (1980), and Beckerman and Jenkinson
(1984). See also Gordon (1977).— 21—
1981 1982 1983 1984
Import prices:U.s. 5.5 —1.6 —3.7 0.3
EEC 15.6 7.1 4.2 8.5
Consumer prices: U.S. 10.4 6.2 3.2 4.3
EEC 11.1 9.8 7.5 6.3
A simple reduced form inflation equation for theyears 1961—80 (based
on a pooledregression prepared two years ago) gives a fairly close post—
sample prediction of 1982—84 developments for both the U.S. and the EEC.
It considers the inflation rate as a sum of lagged inflation(with a
coefficientof 0.66) and current import price change (witha coefficient
of 0.18) along with a capacity term which isignored here. This gives the
predicted rates of 7.1, 3.9, 2.7 for the U.S. during 1982—84 and9.0, 7.6,
6.9 for EEC. The predicted mean inflationduring 1982—84 for the U.S. and
EEC is 4.6 and 7.8, respectively, while the actualrates were 4.6 and 7.9,
not a bad £ it, on the average.
The real depreciation of European currencies relativeto the dollar
thus explains why inflation slowed down so much less faston the European
continent. It may also help to explain why Europe as a wholewas reluctant
to expand and rather adopted contractionary macro policies untilvery
recently. These helped to support the slowdown in inflation but ata for—
inidable cost in terms of unemployment. Eachcountry by itself will not
expand because it risks running into balance of payments problems and
added pressure on its exchange rate (with inflationaryconsequences) and
for all countries to expand simultaneouslyrequires more co—ordination
than seems politically feasible, especially since the U.S.must agree to— 22—
cutits own fiscal deficit pan passu. A turn around in exchange rates,
such as occurred in 1985, could of course alleviate some of the pressure.
On the other hand, too rapid expansion in the OECD countries as a whole
would risk the possibility that relative prices of industrial raw
materials will rise again, but it is a trade—off worth considering.Figure 1.E.E.C. Inflation and Unemployment, 1959-1984





































Table1. Wage Gaps, 12 OECD Countries, 1965—1983, Unadjusted
(Percentages over 1965—69 average)
19651970197319761979 1981 19821983 Country
weightsa
U.s. 1.2—1.3 3.1 0.6 4.0 5.0 5.3 4.9 28.9
Canada —1.7 1.5—1.4 4.6 0.9 1.5 1.8 2.0 3.1
Japan 2.3 4.1 9.821.524.123.420.216.4 20.6
Europe
U.K. —1.5 1.5 3.1 8.1 9.314.313.913.9 11.0
Belgium 0.4 1.718.732.733.031.924.2 — 1.6
Denmark —2.4 2.6 8.5 14.3 16.1 13.1 9.5 4.1 0.8
France 0.3—3.8—0.3 4.9 2.6 2.7 4.1 — 8.9
Germany 1.7 1.9 8.014.014.617.113.3 9.6 12.6
Italy 3.8 4.210.917.8 9.6 6.5 4.8 2.9 8.4
Nether-
lands 2.1 0.2—2.2—1.5—6.5 —16.1 —20.4 — 1.8
Norway —3.2—3.4 0.617.419.4 8.8 7.1 6.4 0.7
Sweden 3.4—2.2—7.4 3.3—3.9—7.6 —11.414.5 1.6
Mean
(weighted) 1.2 1.7 5.310.110.711.1 9.7 — 100.0
Partial
meanb 1.3 1.4 5.810.511.4 12.1 10.6 8.8
Mean 8 countriesc
o 1 1.0 0.6 4.7 9.1 10.711.7 10.5
o= 0.7 0.9 0.7 4.9 9.1 10.311.1 9.8
o= 0.5 0.8 0.9 5.3 9.0 9.810.3 8.9
Notes on following page.— 26—
aRelative size, based on 1975 manufacturing employment levels (percen-
tages).
bWeighted mean of 9 countries for which 1983 observations are recorded.
cWeighted mean of 8 countries (for which capital stock numbers exist)
under alternative CES assumptions (4 countries excluded are Belgium,
Denmark, Italy, and the Netherlands).— 27—







Weighted by 1975 employment levels.
Mean of 9 countries for which 1983 observations are recorded.
1965 19701973























































































































Mean Europe 0.7 1.4 5.9 12.3
Mean Europe exclu-
ding the U.K.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 p DW.
Country
U.s. 2.88—3.41 2.37 0.12—0.05 0.57 0.90 1.87
(0.22)(1.26) (0.44) (0.05)(0.02) (0.30)
Canada —5.15—2.28 2.96 0.15—0.10 —0.03 0.84 1.65
(2.94) (1.06) (0.50) (0.05) (0.04) (0.48)
Japan 4.48—0.61 1.88 0.07 0.971.70
(0.51) (0.14) (0.01) (0.01)
U.K. 0.87—1.75 2.08 0.06 0.63 0.941.63
(0.76) (0.59) (0.50) (0.03) (0.24)
France 1.10 —0.21 3.48 0.04 — 0.781.97
(0.66) (0.67) (0.53) (0.04)
Germany 1.51—1.06 1.70 0.07—0.01 0.43 0.951.73
(0.35) (0.46) (0.27) (0.03) (0.01) (0.31)
Italy 4.33—0.44 3.08 0.07 — 0.650.781.38
(1.36) (0.35) (0.41) (0.02) (0.24)
Sweden 12.48—3.17 6.65 0.22—0.07 —0.952.23
(3.08) (0.82) (0.81) (0.05) (0.04)
a
Numbers in brackets are standarderrors.
Sources:RealRate of Profit (r): Calculated fromOperating Surplus over
capital stock in manufacturing, corrected for relative GDPto invest-
ment goods prices, all from OECD data [Chan—Lee andSutch (1985)J.
Real Product Wage (w): Nominalwage in manufacturing, BLS data def-
lated by GDP prices, OECD.
Demand proxy (d): Manufacturingoutput divided by ten year moving
average, OECD data.— 30—
Table5. Investment Equations for Manufacturing, EightCountries, 1965—82






U.S. —0.90 0.79 —9.00 0.61 0.55 1.83
(1.46) (0.50) (3.15) (0.21)
Canada —1.30 1.07 2.95 0.55 0.60 1.29
(1.23) (0.47) (3.06) (0.23)
Japan —4.47 2.00 0.62 0.33 0.88 1.74
(67—82) (0.89) (0.27) (1.42) (0.29)
1.14 0.20 —0.77 —0.89 0.62 2.37
(0.42) (0.04) (5.06) (0.16)
France —1.57 1.13 10.60 — 0.651.82
(0.68) (0.25) (2.41)
Germany —7.72 3.22 —0.47 0.64 0.91 1.32
(1.41) (0.51) (6.03) (0.21)
Italy —3.86 1.83 —6.29 0.85 0.78 1.70
(2.74) (0.96) (2.00) (0.14)
Sweden —1.81 1.45 —12.74 0.56 1.32
(0.72) (0.33) (5.50)
a Theregression for the U.K. is linear in1 and i.
Source:=logof three year mean rate of profit (OECD EconomicOutlook:
rate of operating surplus over capital stock)
=log(l+realrate of interest), where real rate equalsnominal
rate minus rate of consumer price inflation(IMF)
IC =percentagerate of change, real capital stock (OECD)— 31—
Table6. Demand for Labour in Manufacturing, 1961—82, ElevenCountries
— = c+c 1 -k1)+c2w÷c3df 01—
+cd +{cmj+c5t÷
c6D7582 4w
c1 c2 c3 c4[c] c5 C6 D.H.aNSE
Country
U.S. 0.34 0.17 1.16[0.61] —0.06 0.02 —0.84 .0023
(0.13) (0.30) (0.80) (0.10) (0.01) (0.05)
Canada 1.12—0.29 1.19 0.50 0.02—0.014 —1.34 .0037
(0.16) (0.25) (0.55) (0.18) (0.01) (0.010)
Japan 0.62—1.03 1.41 0.24 0.07—0.02 —0.35 .0033
(0.20) (0.35) (0.73) (0.16) (0.03) (0.01)
U.K. 0.41—0.59 0.46 0.26—0.00—0.022 1.41 .0839
(0.17) (0.21) (0.26) (0.19) (0.01) (0.005)
Belgiuinb 0.45—0.25 — 0.53 0.015 —0.024 —0.01 .0018
(0.12) (0.24) (0.09) (0.005) (0.006)
Denmarkb 0.41—1.20 — 0.61 0.08—0.04 —1.88 .0027
(0.12) (0.24) (0.13) (0.02) (0.01)
France 0.71—0.57 0.67 0.23 0.017 —0.011 —1.40 .0014
(0.11) (0.12) (0.39) (0.08) (0.009) (0.003)
Germany 1.00—0.64 1.98 0.70 0.044 —0.012 1.59 .0026
(0.18) (0.22) (0.74) (0.16) (0.021) (0.008)
ItalyC 0.25—0.76—0.00 0.20 0.026 —0.04 1.30 .0034
(0.23) (0.28) (0.00) (0.18) (0.20) (0.02)
Nether.b 0.76—0.40 0.28 0.019 —0.015 -0.169 .0026
(0.10) (0.17) (0.09) (0.010) (0.009)
Norwayb 0.79—0.104 0.0350.004 -0.008 1.17 .0027
(0.17) (0.056) (0.098) 0.003) (0.005)
a
. DH.is the Durbiri H—coefficient.
b





Source:9. =(log)manhours in manufacturing, BLS data. k =capitalstock
(see table 3). w =productwage (op.cit.). d =deviationsfrom
world trade trend [see Layard and Nickell (1984)]. m =logof
real money stock (IMF). df =inflationcorrected structural defi-
cit (EEC data)
Data in brackets are standard errors of coefficients.— 33—
Table7. Unemployment Equations forEight Countries, 1962—1982
[U =h0+
h1wX1+
h2wX2+h3m1+h4m2+h5d+h6d1(+ hd1 +hdf2) a +timeshift ]
h1 h2 h3 h4 h5[h] h6[h] D.W. NSE
U.S. 20.11—1.44 —4.95—11.05 [—0.27][—0.05] 1.76 0.051 (4.06) (4.89) (1.66) (1.67) (0.11) (0.11)
Canada20.34 8.52 2.31 —7.58 —7.01 1.021.99 0.069 (7.32) (8.47) (3.01) (2.68) (5.57) (5.25)
Japan 2.46 1.44 0.26 0.01 —2.02 —0.832.49 0.035 (0.70) (0.76) (0.45) (0.34) (0.48) (0.62)
U.K. 8.4813.77 —3.27 —1.48 —10.03 —4.251.88 0.087 (6.20) (7.51) (3.62) (2.95) (5.05) (4.72)
Belgium 3.67 7.32 —3.62 0.89 —11.76 —10.621.77 0.045 (2.63) (2.92) (1.97) (1.71) (2.03) (2.02)
Denmark1.7045.04—10.03 13.49 —17.12 —1.271.91 0.109
(14.53) (15.38) (4.99) (4.66) (5.66) (9.50)
France 1.70—5.91 —3.20 2.42 —2.38 —3.822.00 0.047 (2.53) (2.76) (1.58) (1.38) (1.33) (1.50)
Germany7.75 3.62 —4.83 —5.58 —7.27 —3.791.70 0.124 (3.99) (4.03) (1.97) (2.39) (3.06) (2.55)
a
The regressions includeseparate time shift factors for the period
1962—74 and 1975—82 andwere run using AR1.
Sources:Unemployment(U) —OECDstandardized unemployment data.
gg (wX) —SeeTable 1.
Real money balances (m) —IMFdata; for Canada and the U.S.
M2
(of the U.S.) was used.
Governmentdeficit(df) —SeeTable 6.
World trade(d)—SeeTable 6.— 34—
Table8. Adjusted Accounting for the Risein Unemployment Since 1965—1969
(percentages of the labour force)
1970— 1974— 1978- 1982 1970— 1974— 1978— 1982
197419781982 197419781982
U.S. Belgium
Total 1.7 3.5 3.7 5.8 0.3 4.5 8.110.8
Adj. wage gap —0.1 0.1—0.1 0.0 0.7 3.4 5.612.2
Aggregate
demand 1.5 3.2 4.0 5.7 —0.2 1.3 2.3—1.3
Canada Denmark
Total 1.9 3.7 4.4 7.0 0.6 8.0 8.210.2
Adj. wage gap 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.4 2.5 7.811.0 6.3
Aggregate
demand 1.5 3.4 4.3 6.2 —1.5—0.5—2.4 4.6
Japan France
Total 0.1 0.8 1.0 1.1 0.7 2.6 4.8 5.9
Adj. wage gap 0.3 0.9 1.1 1.1 —0.2 0.6 1.4 1.6
Aggregate
demand —0.2—0.1—0.2 0.0 0.9 2.0 3.3 4.3
U.K. Germany
Total 0.9 3.1 6.1 9.5 0.2 2.7 3.3 5.3
Adj. wage gap 0.6 2.5 3.7 5.5 0.3 1.2 1.7 1.9
Aggregate
demand 0.3 0.8 2.0 3.9 —0.1 1.4 1.6 3.4— 35—
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U Unemployment rate (OECD, standardized data).
Percentage change of GDP/GNP (OECD, National Income Accounts).
iiiPercentagechange of real money (M1/CPI from IMF data).
GDP: U.K., France, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Denmark.
GNP: U.S., Germany, Canada, Japan, Belgium, Netherlands.Appendix Table A—2. Average Rate of Change ofProduct, Labour, and Capital
Inputs in Manufacturing, by Subperiod, 1965—1982
(percentages)
1965—70 1972—74 1975—78 1979—82
L K V L K V L K V L K V
U.S. 1.74.23.31.02.94.70.73.63.7 —2.74.3 —1.6
Canada 1.25.75.31.84.66.9 —0.14.01.8 —1.73.8 —1.8
Japan1.9 15.5 13.8 —0.2 11.37.2 —2.0 4.86.00.95.57.6
Europe
U.K.—0.93.82.8 —2.22.92.3 —2.32.4 —0.6 —7.12.1 —4.0
France 0.15.66.50.66.15.7 —2.43.82.9 —3.24.40.1
Germany 0.76.16.0 —2.94.72.6 —3.32.01.6 —2.42.10.2
Italy0.74.78.0 —1.55.55.5 —0.52.61.7 —2.12.52.6
Neth. —2.1 nc7.2 —3.6 nc4.5 —4.0 nc1.2 —2.5 nc0.7
Norway —0.1 nc4.80.0 nc4.6 —2.4 nc —1.4 —1.9 nc0.0
Sweden —1.64.75.0 —1.7 45 3.4 —3.03.5 —2.0 —2.41.80.4
Beig. —0.9 nc6.6 —1.8 nc6.6 —5.6 nc0.7 —4.8 nc0.1
Denm. —1.6 nc4.6 —2.4 nc4.4 —3.4 nc1.0 —1.0 nc1.8
L —Percentagechange of manhours (BLS).
K —Percentagechange of Capital (OECD).
V —Percentagechange of Product (BLS).Appendix Table A—3. Mean Wage Gap, GrossReturn to Capital in Manufacturing
and the Real Interest Rate, by Subperiod, 1965—1982
(percentages)
1965—70 1972—74 1975—78 1979—82
x x x x
w R 1 w R 1 w R 1 w R 1 r r r r
U.s.—0.2 22.41.60.9 17.30.70.8 16.90.75.0 12.7 1.5
Canada 0.3 14.22.8 —0.2 14.41.13.1 12.10.20.7 11.2 2.2
Japan0.7 37.01.49.7 31.0 —3.2 22.6 20.0 —0.3 23.3 21.13.5
Europe
U.K. 0.2 12.63.03.89.30.44.66.7 —2.2 11.85.70.6
France —0.6 16.72.1 —0.1 18.80.34.5 13.1 —0.63.4 12.00.9
Germany 0.3 19.34.66.8 16.42.6 14.2 14.42.8 15.2 12.93.4
Italy0.7 18.1.3.78.6 16.1 —1.5 15.8 13.4 —2.16.5 17.50.3
Neth.0.0 nc1.7 —1.6 nc —0.2 —2.8 nc0.8 13.6 nc4.1
Norway —0.68.30.51.49.6 —1.0 17.8 nc —1.7 12.1 nc nc
Sweden —0.4 11.22.0 —4.99.5 —0.10.66.0 —0.8 —7.45.91.7
Beig.0.3 nc3.2 15.7 nc0.3 32.0 nc0.4 30.7 nc5.0
Denm,0.4 nc2.17.7 nc2.3 13.5 nc3.3 13.6 nc6.5
wX —Wagegap —calculatedfrom manufacturing data (see Table 1).
R —Returnto capital in manufacturing (OECD, Economic Outlook data).
1r —Realinterest rate on government bonds (IMF).